Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-analytical Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory by Burkatzki, Eckhard
Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-analytical 
Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory
Eckhard Burkatzki, International Graduate School Zittau, Germany 
urn:nbn:de:0070 - i jc v -2008261 
IJCV: Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 268 – 287
Vol. 2 (2) 2008
 Editorial (p. 159)
Focus:  Guest Editorial Steven F. Messner / Helmut Thome (pp. 160 – 162)
Anomie / Anomia  
 Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating  
 Institutional-Anomie Theory Steven F. Messner / Helmut Thome / Richard Rosenfeld (pp. 163 – 181)
 Want Amid Plenty: Developing and Testing a Cross-National  
 Measure of Anomie Beth Bjerregaard / John K. Cochran (pp. 182 – 193)
 Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies: Cult of the Individual, Integration Patterns  
 and Delinquency Sabine Frerichs / Richard Münch / Monika Sander (pp. 194 –214)
 Assessing the Relevance of Anomie Theory for Explaining Spatial Variation in  
 Lethal Criminal Violence:  An Aggregate-Level Analysis of Homicide within  
 the United States Brian J. Stults / Eric P. Baumer (pp. 215 – 247)
 Social Structural Effects on the Level and Development of the Individual Experience of  
 Anomie in the German  Population Sandra Legge / Eldad Davidov / Peter Schmidt (pp. 248 – 267)
 Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-Analytical Validation of Some Ideas  
 of Anomie Theory Eckhard Burkatzki (pp. 268 – 287)
Open Section Modernity Strikes Back? A Historical Perspective on the Latest Increase 
 in Interpersonal Violence (1960–1990) Manuel Eisner (pp. 288 – 316)
 Deprivation, Violence, and Conflict: An Analysis of “Naxalite” Activity in the  
 Districts of India Vani K. Borooah (pp. 317 – 333)
All text of the International Journal of Conflict and Violence is subject to the terms of the Digital Peer Publishing Licence. 
http://www.ijcv.org /docs/licence/DPPL_v2_en_06-2004.pdf
269IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 268 – 287Eckhard Burkatzki: Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-analytical Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory
Anomie theorists have been reporting the suppression of shared welfare orientations by the overwhelming dominance of economic values within capitalist 
societies since before the outset of neoliberalism debate. Obligations concerning common welfare are more and more often subordinated to the overarch-
ing aim of realizing economic success goals. This should be especially valid with for social life in contemporary market societies. This empirical investiga-
tion examines the extent to which market imperatives and values of the societal community are anchored within the normative orientations of market 
actors. Special attention is paid to whether the shape of these normative orientations varies with respect to the degree of market inclusion. Empirical 
analyses, based on the data of a standardized written survey within the German working population carried out in 2002, show that different types of norma-
tive orientation can be distinguished among market actors. These types are quite similar to the well-known types of anomic adaptation developed by Robert 
K. Merton in “Social Structure and Anomie” and are externally valid with respect to the prediction of different forms of economic crime. Further analyses 
show that the type of normative orientation actors adopt within everyday life depends on the dregree of market inclusion. Confirming anomie theory, it is 
shown that the individual willingness to subordinate matters of common welfare to the aim of economic success—radical market activism—gets stronger 
the more actors are included in the market sphere. Finally, the relevance of reported findings for the explanation of violent behavior, especially with view to 
varieties of corporate violence, is discussed.
Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-analytical 
Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory
Eckhard Burkatzki, International Graduate School Zittau, Germany 
1. Outline of the Problem
This study is concerned with the impact of market struc-
tures on actors’ norm-related orientations and actions. 
It thus joins a debate, termed the “market and morality 
debate” by Albert O. Hirschman (1986, 105ff.), whose central 
question is to what extent the market as a system of social 
institutions contributes to a strengthening or a weakening 
of the moral order of a society. According to Hirschman, 
the main positions in the market and morality debate are 
those of advocates and critics of a liberal market system. 
Whereas the former, ever since Montesquieu (1689–1755) 
and Hume (1711–1776), have put their faith in the disci-
plining and civilizing power of the market, the opposing 
camp, certainly since the publication of Marx and Engels’s 
Communist Manifesto (1983 [1848]), has cited the processes 
of normative and moral erosion that the market system 
triggers in social life. 
From the very outset, anomie theory, with its structural 
perspective, has taken a skeptical view of the relationship 
between the market and morality. Derived from the Greek 
a = without + nomos = law or rule, the term has generally 
been used to describe a state in which social norms or rules 
are absent from social life (Mestrovic and Brown 1985, 81ff.). 
Historically the concept of anomie is associated primarily 
with Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and his analysis of the so-
cietal impact of early industrialization in France (Durkheim 
1992, 42ff, 437, 480; 1983, 273ff., 291f.).1 Both in his book on 
1 Orru (1983), however, points out that Dur-
kheim actually borrowed his concept of 
anomie from the French social philosopher 
Jean Marie Guyau and changed its mean-
ing in the process (Orru 1983, 499ff.). 
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the division of labor (1992 [1893, 1902]) and in his study 
of suicide (1993 [1897]) Durkheim repeatedly focuses his 
critical attention on the intrinsically expansionary nature 
of early market industrialization and its external effects. In 
Durkheim’s view, industrialization had increasingly led to 
a decline of “public morality” in social life and given rise to 
an “idolization of wealth” (1983, 292) in all spheres of life. 
He believed that growing sectors of the population spent 
their lives almost entirely in an industrial and commercial 
milieu, and that it therefore followed that because their mi-
lieu is shaped only to a weak extent by morality, the greater 
part of their existence takes place outside any kind of moral 
activity (1992, 44). 
Interestingly enough, observations similar to Durkheim’s 
have also been made by contemporary sociologists (for 
example, Bellah et. al. 1992, Neckel 2000). The general view 
is that in Western capitalist countries a transition has taken 
place since the 1980s in the way society is shaped, from a 
modern industrialized society to a post-industrial market 
society (for example, Currie 1990, 1997). In a manner akin to 
Durkheim’s description of industrialization, market societ-
ies are defined as societies “in which market principles, 
instead of being confined to some parts of the economy, 
and appropriately buffered and restrained by other social 
institutions, come to suffuse the whole social fabric” (Currie 
1997, 152). What is qualitatively new about the post-industri-
al society, Currie says, is that here an aggressive materialist 
individualism characterized by a ruthless striving for eco-
nomic success and a permanent awareness of competition 
has become common cultural property (Currie 1997, 161ff.; 
also Taylor 1999, 61ff.). In a similar vein Susanne Karstedt 
(1999, 2004; Karstedt and Farrall 2007) states that the 
structural development trends of markets in contemporary 
Western societies, conditioned not least by globalization 
and neo-liberal deregulation policies, have recently led to 
a sweeping change in the moral economy of these societies 
(Karstedt and Farrall 2007, 2, 4). In terms of the orientations 
informing individual behavior, this change finds expres-
sion in an erosion of legal and moral norms as well as in a 
decline in social trust both in institutions and in interper-
sonal relations (5). It is thus not surprising that Karstedt 
und Farrall also describe this state as anomic, introducing 
the specific term market anomie (5, 6, 7). 
If we apply this diagnosis to the relationship between the 
market and the community, the implication is that the 
imperatives of economic activity—above all in the context 
of market activity, but also in traditional areas of non-
economic activity—will increasingly “erode” and suppress 
formal norms of criminal law and informal rules of fair 
play. Similar observations can be found in the work of vari-
ous writers on legal and criminal sociology in the field of 
anomie theory. These will be addressed only briefly here, 
however. If we look at the last two decades we find such 
authors as James W. Coleman (1987, 406ff.; 2002, 188ff.) or 
Elliott Currie (1997, 152; 1998, 133f.). More recently similar 
theses have been expounded in the publications of Mess-
ner (2003), Messner and Rosenfeld (1997, 2000), Karstedt 
(1999, 2004), and Karstedt and Farrall (2007). A problematic 
aspect of these studies is that they look at the relationship 
between the market and morality chiefly on the macro-
analytical level in terms of social change processes. The 
thesis on which their arguments are based, namely, that the 
increasing dominance of the market is bringing about an 
erosion of actors’ normative and moral commitment, has 
to date never been explicitly subjected to a micro-analytical 
examination.
The current study therefore aims to fill a gap in the research 
literature. Specifically it examines to what extent behav-
ioral imperatives, which are communicated to members of 
a society on the one hand via the market and on the other 
by the social community, are anchored in the norm-related 
orientations of social actors. The study focuses particularly 
on the question of what forms of norm-related orientations 
and behavior distinguish actors who are gradually and to 
varying degrees becoming more involved in the market—
1 Like Currie, Taylor (1999, 52) characterizes a 
market society as a society “in which everything 
(from consumer goods to public good[s], like 
health or educational opportunity) is for sale.” 
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in other words, actors whose everyday life is dominated to 
varying extents by market conditions and market develop-
ments. The main question in this context is to what extent 
empirical support is found for the thesis that orientations 
based on legal norms and the rules of fair play are being 
suppressed and eroded by the behavioral imperatives of the 
economy among strongly market-oriented actors.
2. The Theoretical Framework
The theoretical starting point of the study is the assumption 
drawn from differentiation theory that actors always operate 
in a framework of competing social order systems. Kauf-
mann (1983, 474ff.) and also Streeck and Schmitter (1985, 
119ff.) identify central order systems as being the community, 
the state or law, and the market, each of which has its own 
guiding principles of informal control as well as, in the case 
of the community, spontaneous solidarity; in the case of the 
law, hierarchical control combined with the threat of sanc-
tions of various kinds and a belief in the legitimacy of the 
prevailing order (Weber 1980 [1921], 16ff.); and in the case of 
the market, free competition linked to the ultimate goal of 
maximizing profit (see Figure 1).4
Figure 1: Systems of social order, system-specific 
 guiding principles, and norm-related orientations
Order system Guiding principles
Norm-related  
orientations
Community
Informal control,  
spontaneous solidarity
Communitarianism
State/law
Hierarchical control 
(threat of sanctions), 
belief in legitimacy
Nomocentrism
Market
Free competition, 
profit maximization
Economism
Inspired by Parsons’s concept of the control hierarchy (Par-
sons 1983, 157ff.; see also Turner 1991, 65) we assume that the 
community, the law, and the market guide and regulate the 
actions of individuals at different levels simultaneously by 
generating norm-related orientations. Thus via the guiding 
principles of informal control and spontaneous solidarity 
the community generates communitarian orientations, 
here termed communitarianism (Latin: communitas = 
the community).5 By defining criminal offences and the 
associated sanctions the law—in particular criminal law—
generates orientations based on legal norms, here labelled 
nomocentrism (Greek: nomos = the law).6 Finally the mar-
ket, via its guiding principles of free competition and profit 
maximization, generates economic orientations or rather a 
commitment to achieving economic goals, here referred to 
as economism, among social actors.
In this study the order system of the market will be concep-
tualized as a normative system just like the community and 
the law. The study therefore assumes that both in the field 
of employment and in other areas of the market individu-
als will be confronted with the principles of free competi-
tion and profit maximization as valid norms and will thus 
be urged to realize their advantages if they are not to be 
excluded from competition—in other words, to behave in a 
market-conformist manner.7 What is meant here by market-
conformist behavior is, in the event of conflicting goals, 
giving priority to the economic principle of profit maxi-
mization, ahead of other principles like altruistic interests, 
charitable goals, or even legal stipulations.
It should be noted that there is a certain amount of tension 
between the various norm-related orientations. Indeed, for 
certain periods of time and in certain situations they may 
enter into competition with one another. There are, for 
instance, situations in which the economic imperative to 
3 By market involvement or inclusion we mean here 
the degree of proximity of actors’ everyday decision-
making to entrepreneurial decisions or to factors 
influencing the flow of payments, which according 
to Luhmann constitute the economic system and the 
market economy, respectively (Luhmann 1999, 52ff.).
4 The term law refers here and in the following 
primarily to the field of repressive or criminal law. 
5 Here the concept of communitarianism serves 
exclusively to denote a positive communitarian 
orientation, and ignores its more complex roots in 
the social theory of Michael Sandel (1982), Charles 
Taylor (1985a; 1985b; 1993), Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1987), Amitai Etzioni (1988; 1998), and others.
6 The term nomocentrism is taken from the 
work of Speyer-based values researcher Helmut 
Klages (1988, 64ff.). It is used in the context of 
the value shift from primarily nomocentric to 
primarily autocentric values that he identified as 
having taken place in Germany during the 1970s 
and 1980s. According to Klages nomocentrism 
means a stronger orientation towards the values 
of obligation and acceptance. The concept is based 
on an authoritarian understanding of norms. 
7 This conceptualization of the market as a 
normative system is modeled on Max Weber’s 
description of the capitalist economic order in 
“Protestant Ethics” (Weber 1988 [1905], 37).
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“make a profit” contradicts legal norms, for example when a 
legal ban on insider trading or bribery prevents individuals 
from realizing their economic advantage. What is more, the 
central imperative of making a profit may also be at odds 
with the moral requirements and obligations of a social 
community, as, for example, when profits are achieved 
legally but at the expense of the common good.
With regard to norm-related orientations the study fur-
ther assumes that these are not uniformly strong among 
all members of society. Rather a central assumption from 
which the research for the current study proceeds is that, 
depending on the social position of the actors—within 
social structures in general and with respect to market 
activity in particular—the strength of these orientations 
will vary. Our thesis is, therefore, that under the specific 
influence of each of the order systems—community, law, 
and the market—actors in different social positions will 
form a specific normative habitus with respect to each of the 
different norm-related orientations, which will determine 
their attitude to the legitimacy of formal legal and informal 
community norms on a day-to-day basis. The more strongly 
involved actors are in market structures, so the theory goes, 
the more pressure they will feel to be successful and to com-
pete and the more the legitimacy of the normative expecta-
tions of the community and the law will be subjugated to 
the imperative of economic utility and the personal success 
and competitive orientation associated with it. 
On the basis of these theoretical considerations the study 
investigated the following research questions:
(1)  What profiles or patterns of nomocentric, economic 
and communitarian orientations can be distinguished 
among the population?
(2)  Is there a connection between the orientation patterns of 
actors and their willingness to realize their own advan-
tage by illegal or illegitimate means?
(3)  Is there a connection between degree of involvement in 
the market and actors’ norm-related orientations?
3. Data and Methodology
In order to answer the research questions a standardized 
written survey of members of the working population 
was carried out in 2002 using a cross-sectional design. 
The study subjects were  students and teachers at various 
adult education institutions in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
Around 1,200 questionnaires were distributed and 440 were 
returned completed, equivalent to a response rate of about 
37 percent. Finally 390 of the completed questionnaires were 
judged to be valid and suitable for further analysis. It should 
be noted that the empirical investigation was organized as 
a pilot study, so the participants were not a representative 
random sample.8
As far as possible the concept of actors’ norm-related ori-
entations was operationalized using tested opinion survey 
instruments and items. In order to ascertain their nomo-
centric orientations, respondents were presented with the 
following items and asked to say whether they agreed or 
disagreed with them:
1.  “It is important to respect law and order.” (r=0.70)9
2.  “You should obey laws even if you don’t agree with 
them.”(r=0.78)
3.  “Laws are only made for worst-case scenarios. So in 
everyday life it is not really important to obey every law.” 
(r=0.79)
4.  “There are some unjust laws that you don’t have to obey.” 
(r=0.79)
Respondents were asked to rate Item 1 on a seven-point 
scale, ranging from (1) Not important to (7) Extremely 
important. Agreement or disagreement with Items 2 to 4 
was expressed on a four-point scale with the options: (1) 
Disagree completely, (2) Tend to disagree, (3) Tend to agree, 
and (4) Agree completely. Principal components analy-
8 For reasons of space a description of the 
survey methods and random study sample 
were omitted here. A more detailed account 
of the methodology and data of our study can 
be found in Burkatzki 2007, 69ff., 304ff.
9 Here and in the following, the r-coeffi-
cient designates the item loadings in rela-
tion to the principal component.
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sis confirms that the items selected for the nomocentric 
orientations are based on a one-dimensional structure.10 
The extracted components alone explain 60.1 percent of the 
variation in the underlying indicator variables.
For economic orientations two items were used to establish 
the subjective relevance of advancement goals and profit op-
portunities in the labor and financial markets: “If you think 
about what means a lot for you in your private life and at 
work, how important are the following things?” The respon-
dents were given the following statements to evaluate:
1.  “To make use of opportunities for advancement and 
promotion.” (r=0.64)
2.  “To realize big returns from capital and investment 
deals.” (r=0.75)
The respondents were asked to evaluate these items on a 
four-point scale with the options: (1) Very important, (2) 
Quite important, (3) Not very important, and (4) Not im-
portant at all.
To find out how committed the respondents were to eco-
nomic goals they were asked a further question: “People 
who are active in economic life often receive varying 
amounts of recognition among the population. We are in-
terested in what attitude you personally have to the follow-
ing groups. In your view do the members of these groups 
deserve a high, medium, or low degree of recognition?” 
Here the respondents were asked to evaluate the following 
two items:
1.  “People who have made a lot of money by buying and 
selling shares.” (r=0.75)
2.  “People who borrow money with the explicit purpose of 
getting tax breaks.” (r=0.62)
Respondents were asked to evaluate these items on a three-
point scale: (1) A high degree of recognition, (2) A medium 
degree of recognition, and (3) A low degree of recognition. 
All the items were recoded to represent a positive com-
mitment to economic goals. In this case, too, principal 
component analysis shows that the items are based on a 
one-dimensional structure. Although at 47.6 percent not 
fully satisfactory, the share of the variation explained by the 
principal components is tolerable. 
The concept of community orientations was used to find out 
to what extent people felt committed to personal norms of 
altruism, solidarity, and reciprocity. As a reference point we 
used Steenbergen’s ANES Humanitarianism Scale (1999). 
For the purposes of our study the following two items were 
selected from Steenbergen’s original scale:
1.  “One should always look for ways to help others who are 
less fortunate than oneself.” (r=0.74)
2.  “A person should always endeavor to ensure the well-
being of others.” (r=0.73)
The following items were added to the scale. 
3.  “The common interest comes before personal interest.” 
(r=0.66)
4.  “The dignity of the individual and the well-being of all 
should be the most important thing in any society.”  
(r=-0.65)
5.  “I always think of myself first without much consider-
ation for others.” (r=0.58)
Respondents were asked to evaluate these on a four-point 
scale: (1) Disagree completely, (2) Tend to disagree, (3) Tend 
to agree, and (4) Agree completely. Here, too, principal 
component analysis confirms that the item is based on a 
one-dimensional structure. At 45.4 percent the share of the 
variation that can be explained by the principal components 
also seems to be tolerable. 
4. Findings
4.1 Norm-related Orientation Patterns
In order to answer the first research question the combined 
values for nomocentric, economic, and communitarian 
10 Principal component analysis is a multivariate 
method of data analysis, which aims to order a large 
number of variables into a few groups of largely 
independent variables according to their correla-
tive relationships (Bortz 1999, 495ff.). If we use a 
geometric model to illustrate this method, it can 
be described as the projection of a p-dimensional 
space defined by the number of output variables 
onto a smaller subspace with m axes (the princi-
pal components). Analogous to their scores on 
the output variables each respondent is allocated 
principal component values for each of the m 
principal components. The principal component 
values correspond with the specific profiles of the 
respondents on the output variables of the analysis.
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orientations were investigated using cluster analysis.11 The 
various main dimensions of the norm-related orientations 
served as classification variables for the analysis. The start-
ing point was the scores of the respondents on the various 
principal components. The cluster technique was used in 
order to obtain an empirically founded typology for the 
norm-related orientation patterns of actors. On the basis of 
the available formal statistical selection criteria—given the 
fundamental classification variables—this procedure yield-
ed a five-cluster solution as the best model for describing 
norm-related orientation patterns in the random sample.12
11 Cluster analysis is a method of statistical analysis 
used to classify objects, which aims to group 
the elements of a set—in our case the units of a 
random sample—according to points of similarity 
vis-à-vis pre-selected classification features. For the 
purpose of this study hierarchical cluster analyses 
after Ward and using k-means were performed 
consecutively. For an introduction to cluster 
analysis we refer the reader to Bortz (1999, 547ff.), 
Bacher (1996), Bailey (1996), and Gordon (1999).
12 In the context of hierarchical cluster analysis 
PRE statistics and the F-Max value  were used 
alongside dendrogram and structogram analyses 
as reference points for model selection (Bortz 1999, 
559f.; Bacher 1996, 316ff.). A detailed description of 
the process of model selection used in the current 
study can be found in Burkatzki 2007, 312ff., 315ff..
Figure 2: Cluster types for patterns of nomocentric, economic, and communitarian orientation among the German working population (n=367)
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Figure 2 shows the mean values for nomocentric, economic, 
and communitarian orientations in the various clusters as 
deviations from the respective mean value for that orienta-
tion for the random sample as a whole (represented by the 
horizontal axis).13 The typology of norm-related orientation 
patterns is determined by the combined values for the ori-
entation variables in the clusters. In order to distinguish the 
orientation types linguistically, each was given an appropri-
ate label that summed up the particular type of orientation.
The label “norm-oriented market activist” was used in the 
cluster typology to denote an orientation pattern character-
ized by a strong commitment to economic success com-
bined with an above-average orientation toward legal norms 
and communitarian values. The “norm-oriented market 
activist” is an actor whose behavior is oriented toward eco-
nomic success, but who lets himself be restrained by legal 
imperatives and communitarian obligations. In this respect 
the term describes the ideal type of an actor who seems 
to have internalized the classical entrepreneurial ethics of 
republican virtue and social responsibility.
More or less as the counter-model to the “norm-oriented 
market activist” we find in the cluster typology the “radi-
cal market activist.” This type is likewise characterized by a 
very strong, above-average commitment to economic suc-
cess, but in this case the orientations related to legal norms 
and communitarian obligations are very much weaker than 
average. In our typology the “radical market activist” rep-
resents the type of actor who puts the legitimacy of formal 
legal and communitarian values decisively and radically 
below the importance of realizing his market interests. The 
orientation profile of the “radical market activist” strongly 
suggests that people of this type have an anomic attitude to 
norms, associated with a raised tendency to use illegal and 
illegitimate means to gain advantages.
In our typology the complementary type to the “radical 
market activist” is the “market-distant conventionalist.” 
This type is characterized by a very strongly above average 
orientation toward legal and communitarian norms, while 
his commitment to economic success is well below aver-
age. In this respect the “market-distant conventionalist” 
resembles the “order-loving conventionalist” in the Speyer 
value typology conceived by Helmut Klages and his fellow 
researchers (Klages 1996, 78ff.; Gensicke 1998; Klages and 
Gensicke 1999, 63ff.).
A further orientation pattern to emerge from the cluster 
analysis is characterized by a below average communitar-
ian orientation, a slightly below average commitment to 
economic success, and parallel to this an average to slightly 
above average orientation toward legal norms. Apart from 
a strong tendency to distance himself from communitar-
ian obligations, this type does not reveal any clear priority 
structure. What is apparent is that the members of this 
cluster tend to isolate themselves both from the efficiency 
and profitability requirements of the market and to a great 
extent from the community as well. The anti-communitari-
an sentiments of this type of actor together with a tendency 
toward disinterest in economic goals led us to label the 
members of this cluster “disinterested.”
Finally, the contrasting type to the orientation pattern “dis-
interested” is the “post-conventional communitarian,” who 
is characterized primarily by a strongly above-average com-
munity orientation combined with a strongly below-average 
orientation to formal legal norms.14 In this case commit-
ment to the order system of a social community is paired 
with a very distanced attitude to legal requirements, which 
in practice implies a willingness to treat legal norms in a 
rather unconventional fashion. For this orientation type the 
13 The specific reference point here is the ar-
ithmetical mean of the various cluster popula-
tions on the level of z-standardized principal 
component values for the nomocentric, eco-
nomic, and communitarian orientations.
14 Semantically the term “post-conventional” is 
based on Kohlberg’s theory of a post-conventional 
stage of moral development (Kohlberg and Althof 
1996: 135ff.), without, however, in this case assum-
ing an ontogenetic model of moral development. 
This label is simply used to emphasize that this 
orientation type adheres to norms or conventions 
not because of their procedural legitimacy and 
authority, but instead examines the legitimacy of 
norm prescriptions with respect to how univer-
sally they can be applied for the benefit of the 
common good and with respect to the expected 
consequences of a deviation from these norms 
under the conditions of a given situation.
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criterion for adhering to legal norms is the extent to which 
a violation of these norms harms the collective common 
good in a given situation. Blind obedience to legal norms 
divorced from a subjective evaluation of the consequences 
for the common good in a given situation can therefore not 
be expected from the “post-conventional communitarian.”15
It remains to be said that norm-related orientations among 
the types described—although obtained by empirical 
inductive means—are in fact exaggerated ideals of real ori-
entation profiles, designed to contrast with one another and 
which in the context of the present study have primarily a 
heuristic and ordering function. 
It should also be stated that the typology presented here, 
though derived in a different context, has certain unmistak-
able analogies with Merton’s typology of individual forms 
of adaptation (Merton 1995 [1957], 135ff. and 169ff.). Merton 
constructed a typology of individual forms of adaptation by 
combining the differing degrees of acceptance of a society’s 
economic goals and its institutionally legitimized means of 
achieving these goals. Merton’s scale of acceptance of eco-
nomic goals can be compared with the degree of orienta-
tion toward economic advancement and profit measured in 
the current study, while his acceptance of institutionalized 
means of achieving these goals can be compared with the 
extent of orientation toward formal legal norms or a general 
acceptance of the law. It is interesting that Merton, too, dis-
tinguished between five forms of adaptation. The norm-ori-
ented market activist from our study thus corresponds with 
Merton’s conformist (Merton 1995, 136). The radical market 
activist, on the other hand, corresponds with the type that 
Merton calls the innovator, who pursues the economic goals 
of a society but is also prepared to use non-institutionalized, 
illegitimate means to achieve these goals (136ff. and 169ff.). 
The market-distant conventionalist is the equivalent of 
Merton’s ritualist, who is committed to a society’s institu-
tional means but in so doing relinquishes economic goals 
(144ff. and 176ff.). To continue the analogy, the disinterested 
type partially resembles Merton’s retreatist, who is the type 
of person who rejects the declared goals of a society and no 
longer has much respect for institutionalized means (147ff. 
and 179ff.). The post-conventional communitarian, finally, 
resembles to some extent Merton’s rebel, who regards the 
underlying legitimacy structure of cultural goals and the 
institutionalized means of a society as arbitrary notions and 
counters these with his or her own order system (150f. and 
181ff.). 
Here it should be emphasized that—unlike the typology 
of the current study—Merton’s typology originated in the 
context of a systematic analysis of ends-means discrepan-
cies, with which actors occupying different positions in the 
social structure are confronted to differing extents (135). The 
typology of the current study, by contrast, is based not on 
an analysis of ends-means discrepancies, but on an empiri-
cal reconstruction of norm-related orientations toward the 
imperatives and demands of the social order systems of 
the state or the law, the market, and the community. At the 
same time, the pattern of acceptance or rejection of socially 
dominant economic goals and rejection or advocacy of 
legitimate means developed by Merton can be transposed 
into a framework that corresponds with the comparison 
undertaken here of differing degrees of nomocentric or 
economic orientation. And it is precisely in this sense that 
Merton’s innovator can be compared with the radical mar-
ket activist, or his ritualist with the market-distant conven-
tionalist: namely, as a pattern of norm-related orientations 
that is structurally analogous. 
This implies that the structural similarities identified 
between our typology of norm-related orientation patterns 
15 In the way that post-conventional commu-
nitarians order their priorities an orientation 
pattern emerges that the legal sociologist Doris 
Lucke (1995, 1996) may have had in mind when 
she noted a change in the “acceptance culture” 
and in this context proclaimed the “end of homo 
legalis.” Particularly in the context of the debate 
on the erosion of norms (Frommel  and Gess-
ner 1996) she constructed as a counter-type a 
post-conventional actor, who always questions 
the legitimacy of legal norms in a given situation 
and in cases of perceived legitimacy deficits takes 
the liberty of choosing not to adhere to norms.
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and Merton’s typology of individual forms of adaptation 
do not mean that the various types are exactly equivalent. 
One major difference between them is the fact that the cur-
rent study, alongside the general acceptance of legal norms 
and the commitment to economic goals, also takes explicit 
account of the communitarian orientations of actors as an 
orientation dimension for distinguishing between  norm-
related orientation patterns. This is of particular interest in 
cases—like that of the non-conformist communitarian—
where a rejection of the formal legal norms is associated 
with a strong communitarian orientation. 
4.2 Norm-related Orientation Patterns and Willing-
ness to use Illegal Means for Personal Gain 
The answer to the second research question, which con-
cerned the connection between norm-related orientation 
patterns of actors and their willingness to use illegal means 
for personal gain, was obtained by looking at the responses 
to the questions about how willing participants were to 
commit various instrumental property offences, and how 
frequently they had done so. In terms of methodology the 
study borrowed methods used in criminology to study 
unreported crime.16 Respondents were asked—after be-
ing given express assurance that their responses remain 
anonymous—whether they would commit various types 
of offences if there were only a small chance of being found 
out. Here we used the vignette technique: respondents were 
presented with a scenario that involved a decision-making 
dilemma and they were asked how they would decide if they 
were in this situation.17
In a vignette on willingness to engage in criminal offences 
respondents were asked to imagine that they were employ-
ees of a pharmaceutical company that had recently gone 
public. They were told the following: The company is work-
ing on a new anti-cancer drug and you have been informed 
by a confidential source that the results of the latest drug 
trials are positive. You also know that when this news is 
published in the next few days the value of the company’s 
shares will jump and may even double. In this situation you 
think about buying more of the company’s shares before the 
positive results are published. The investment sum named 
is 15,000 euros. You know that if you were to buy the shares 
you would be committing a punishable offence, since you 
would be buying shares using information that at this point 
is not accessible to other shareholders outside the company. 
Nevertheless, no-one can really prove that at the time you 
bought the shares you knew about the positive results of the 
trials for the new anti-cancer drug. 
After having this vignette presented to them the respon-
dents were asked to say how probable it was in such a 
situation that they would buy additional shares prior to 
publication of the test results. Their responses were graded 
on a scale consisting of four categories: (1) Very unlikely, (2) 
Rather unlikely, (3) Rather likely, and (4) Very likely.
16 On this method of criminological research 
see, for example Kaiser (1993, 220ff.).
17 The vignette has recently been used for 
the empirical investigation of social norms 
and norm-led behavior (see, for instance, 
Jasso and Opp 1997; Beck and Opp 2001).
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Figure 3: Willingness to engage in illegal share-buying given a hypothetical opportunity for 
 in sider  trading, differentiated according to membership of clusters (n=365)
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Cramer’s V=0.320; p<0.001.
Note: for the purposes of analysis the responses were divided into just two categories. The graphic shows the proportion of respondents who answered the question of whether they would buy 
shares before publication of the positive results with either “rather likely” or “very likely.” The black vertical line in the graphic marks the proportion of persons from the random survey sample who 
answered the question with either “rather likely” or “very likely.”
Source: Wirtschaft und Ethik, 2002.
The responses to this question show that 60 percent of all 
respondents believe that it is rather or very likely that they 
would buy additional shares illegally. As Figure 3 shows, 
there are significant differences between the different norm-
related orientation types in their degree of willingness to 
commit a criminal offence. The greatest willingness to buy 
shares illegally is shown by the radical market activists. The 
high proportion of respondents with a greater willingness 
to commit a criminal offence (at 86 percent well above aver-
age) shows that—as expected—when people with a strong 
economic commitment combined with weak nomocentric 
and communitarian orientations have to decide between 
the interests of economic gain on the one hand and the le-
gitimacy of legal norms on the other, they tend to decide in 
favor of economic gain.18 This stands in contrast to the well 
below average willingness of the market-distant conven-
tionalists to commit a criminal offence. Nevertheless, even 
in this group the proportion of people prepared to commit 
a criminal offence is still almost 36 percent. This illustrates 
on the one hand that when faced with a very favorable and 
financially attractive opportunity even actors with a strong 
commitment to norms develop a willingness to violate nor-
mative prescriptions. In other words, a greater commitment 
to the law and to the common good seems only to have a 
18 This finding is also confirmed by a linear 
regression analysis of willingness to engage in il-
legal share-buying on the nomocentric, economic 
and communitarian orientations of the respon-
dents (Burkatzki 2007, 157ff.). Here significant 
positive effects of nomocentric and communitar-
ian orientations on the willingness to commit 
a criminal offence and a significant negative 
effect of the economic orientation were found.
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moderating influence on individual willingness to commit 
a criminal offence. On the other hand, recognition of the 
legitimacy of state laws—as expressed in the nomocentric 
orientations of actors—and a strong commitment to com-
munitarian values still seem to reduce willingness to use 
illegal means for personal gain. This view is also supported 
by the “only” average degree of willingness—by compari-
son with radical market activists—of the norm-oriented 
market activists and the post-conventional communitarians 
to commit a criminal offence. The degree of willingness to 
commit a criminal offence of the disinterested, also average, 
indicates that this type—despite their below average com-
mitment to economic goals—would not pass up the chance 
of an easy opportunity for economic gain, especially since 
here communitarian commitments do not play a restricting 
role.
At the same time it would be wrong on the basis of a ficti-
tious scenario to draw direct conclusions about actors’ real 
willingness to commit a criminal offence. For committing 
criminal offences also depends on other factors aside from 
norm-related orientations, such as the motivation to com-
mit an offence, as well as on being given and making use 
of opportunities to engage in criminal acts (Lamnek 2001, 
13ff.). It is, however, interesting to observe in this context 
that the findings on the relative willingness of the differ-
ent orientation types to commit a criminal offence ob-
tained using the vignette can be partially confirmed by the 
self-reported frequency of economic crime. As part of the 
survey respondents were also asked to say how often they 
had committed various low-level economic offences dur-
ing the previous five years. This included offences such as 
workplace theft (see Figure 4) and giving false information 
for the purposes of tax evasion (see Figure 5).
The results show clearly that the distribution pattern of in-
cidence of criminality for the individual orientation types is 
similar to that for the degree of willingness to engage in ille-
gal share-buying. Here, too, it is the radical market activists 
and the market-distant conventionalists who show by far 
the highest and lowest incidence of criminality, respectively. 
Similarly, the figure for the norm-oriented market activists 
shows—analogous to the scenario for insider trading—a 
below average incidence of criminality both for stealing ma-
terials from the place of work and for tax evasion, although 
in absolute terms it is higher than the incidence for the 
market-distant conventionalists. By comparison, the disin-
terested and the post-conventional communitarians show 
a slightly above-average incidence of criminality, which 
underlines the increased willingness of these orientation 
types to take a flexible attitude to legal norms. It remains 
to be said that the post-conventional communitarians, 
although generally not averse to engaging in illegal personal 
gain in the context of economic transactions, are the group 
in the study sample that, unlike the disinterested, are more 
strongly involved than all the other orientation types in 
social volunteering—for example, in school and youth work 
and in charitable church activities.19
The analyses appear to confirm empirically the hypothesis 
of a connection between the norm-related orientation pat-
terns of actors and their willingness to engage in illegal and 
illegitimate means of personal gain. The orientation pattern 
of the radical market activists thus proves to be particularly 
criminogenic. With respect to the offences investigated by 
the study, actors with this orientation pattern showed by 
far the greatest degree of willingness to commit criminal 
offences and also the highest incidence of criminality. The 
disinterested and the post-conventional communitarians 
also showed—measured against the overall average—a 
slightly greater tendency to engage in economic crime, but 
their ambitions were well below those of the radical market 
activists. By contrast, the norm-oriented market activists 
and above all the market-distant conventionalists show a 
disproportionately conformist style of behavior, which tips 
the scales in favor of adhering to legal norms rather than 
making use of opportunities for illegal personal gain.
19 On these findings, not documented 
here, see Burkatzki 2007, 199–212. 
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Figure 4: Mean incidence of unauthorized taking of materials from place of work in the last five years  before 
the survey was conducted; differentiated according to membership of clusters (n=325)
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Eta²=0.046; p=0.005.
The black vertical line in the graphic shows the mean incidence of criminality in the random sample as a whole. All self-employed respondents were excluded from the analysis.
Source: Wirtschaft und Ethik, 2002.
Figure 5: Mean incidence of tax evasion in the last five years before the study was  conducted; 
 differentiated according to membership of clusters (n=361)
0.9
1.7
0.6
1.1
1.1
Average incidence of criminality
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
Normoriented
market activists
Radical market
activists
Market-distant
conventionalists
Disinterested
Postconventional
communitarians
Eta²=0.047; p=0.001.
The black vertical line in the graphic shows the mean incidence of criminality in the random sample as a whole.
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4.3 Norm-related Orientation Patterns and Degree of Market Inclusion
In answering research question number three regarding the 
market inclusion of the various orientation types, we focus 
particularly on what part of the workforce the respondents 
belong to. Here the analyses focused particularly on three 
groups: trainees, employees, and the self-employed. For the 
purposes of the analyses we assumed that trainees would 
show a relatively low degree of market inclusion while the 
self-employed would show a high degree of market inclu-
sion. We also used a status hierarchy for the employee 
groups, subdividing them into low-, middle- and high-
ranking employees to reflect differences in the degree of 
market inclusion. Here it was assumed that the low-ranking 
employees performing simple tasks would show a low 
degree of market inclusion, while middle-ranking employ-
ees performing qualified tasks would have a middle level of 
market inclusion, and high-ranking employees performing 
managerial or leadership functions would tend to have a 
high level of market inclusion in their individual decision-
making. Using membership of these employment groups 
and employment status within the group as a basis we then 
tried to ascertain whether there was a link between norm-
related orientation patterns and the degree of market inclu-
sion that informed their decision-making behavior.
Figure 6: Nomocentric, economic, and communitarian orientations in the German working population, differentiated  according 
to membership of employment groups: trainees, low- medium- and high-ranking employees, and the self-employed
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Thus the orientation profile of the trainees, in relation 
to the nomocentric and economic orientations, shows a 
partial similarity with the orientation pattern of the norm-
oriented market activists. The average orientation profile of 
the low-ranking employees shows a considerable degree of 
similarity with the orientation pattern of our market-distant 
conventionalists. The orientation profile of the high-ranking 
employees also tends to resemble the orientation pattern of 
the post-conventional communitarians. Finally, the orienta-
tion profile of the self-employed—in relation to nomocentric 
or economic orientation—shows at least a partial similarity 
with the orientation patterns of the radical market activists.
The descriptive findings outlined are also supported by the 
results of further bivariate and multivariate analyses (see 
Figure 7).20
20 The multivariate analyses investigated to what 
extent the disproportionate representation of 
individual orientation types in the employment 
groups was statistically significant when we also 
controlled for age, gender, and educational differ-
ences (see Burkatzki 2007, 221-225). The results of 
the multivariate analyses are not documented here.
Figure 7: Proportion of norm-related orientation patterns in the various employment groups (n=267)
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The analysis reveals a disproportionately strong presence 
of norm-oriented market activists among the trainees, 
where they represent 50 percent according to the evidence 
of our sample. In all the other employment groups the share 
of norm-oriented market activists is much lower. If one 
considers here the share of norm-oriented market activists 
in the employment groups, which decreases as the degree of 
influence and power over entrepreneurial decision-making 
processes rises, the impression is gained that the values of 
norm-oriented market engagement become increasingly 
suppressed the more actors become involved in entre-
preneurial decision-making. By contrast, market-distant 
conventionalist attitudes are particularly strongly present 
among low-ranking employees, who generally appear to 
be strongly norm-fixated. Except among trainees, market-
distant conventionalists are to be found in all the profes-
sional status and employment groups, but in the other 
groups their share is well below the value for the group of 
low-ranking employees. Finally we may observe that the 
radical market activists, who have proven to be most crimi-
nally inclined, are most strongly represented in the group 
of high-ranking employees and are concentrated above all 
among the self-employed. According to the analyses, the 
post-conventional communitarians also show an above 
average representation in these groups. 
These findings convey the impression that an increased 
willingness to take a flexible approach to legal norms, which 
among the radical market activists is explicitly associated 
with a tendency toward a lack of social consideration, is 
primarily found among groups of actors who are closer 
to the center of market activity or in greater proximity to 
entrepreneurial decision-making processes.21
5. Conclusions
The present study set out to investigate the influence of mar-
ket structures on the norm-related orientations and actions 
of actors. The main question asked was what norm-related 
orientation patterns can be observed among market actors 
with respect to legal, economic, and community values. A 
related issue was to test the hypothesis that the increasing 
market inclusion of actors is associated with the suppression 
and erosion of orientations related to legal norms and fair 
play as a result of an orientation based chiefly on economic 
values. The study findings show that—with respect to 
nomocentric, economic, and communitarian orientations—
five types of norm-related orientation patterns can be 
distinguished. In the sense that it shows degrees of com-
mitment to economic values and to the legitimacy of legal 
norms the typology closely resembles Merton’s typology of 
anomic adaptation types. Three of the five different types—
the norm-oriented market activists, the radical market 
activists, and the market-distant conventionalists—turned 
out to be externally valid with respect to predicting individ-
ual intentions regarding engaging in illegal and illegitimate 
means of personal gain. Further analyses showed that the 
average representation of the various orientation patterns 
varies with the degree of market inclusion.
If we now return to our original thesis, that in post-indus-
trial market societies values related to the common good 
are increasingly being eroded by a dominance of economic 
imperatives in the value-orientations of actors, the “norm-
oriented market activist” type would at first sight appear to 
contradict this assumption. For the high degree of com-
mitment to economic goals is accompanied among persons 
of this type by a positive commitment to the legitimacy of 
both formal legal and informal social norms. At the same 
time, the analyses of market inclusion suggest that the 
norm-oriented market activist—with regard to the employ-
ment and labor market—can be located less at the center 
and much more on the periphery of market activity: namely 
among trainees. The radical market activist, who places 
the importance of legal and communitarian issues firmly 
below his main goal of personal economic gain seems, by 
contrast—if one considers which employment groups he is 
21 Further multivariate analyses based on the 
respondents’ own reporting of criminal offences 
committed showed, for instance, that the “radical 
market activists” were significantly more likely than 
actors with other norm-related orientation patterns 
to flee the scene of an accident after damaging 
someone else’s vehicle (Burkatzki 2007, 178f.). 
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represented in—to be more at the center of market activity.22 
This finding suggests that there is a connection between 
membership of a particular employment group (or labor 
market status) and norm-related orientation patterns. It 
appears that under the prevailing social conditions nomo-
centric commitments lose their relevance the more actors—
measured in terms of professional rank—take on profes-
sional leadership functions or engage in entrepreneurial 
activity on a self-employed basis. These findings suggest 
that the legitimacy of legal and communitarian norms only 
partially conforms with the requirements of the market. 
At least in the light of the findings it would appear that in 
contemporary society the law and the community have a 
higher value for actors on the periphery of the market than 
for actors at the center of market activity. 
It should be noted, however, that the power of the empirical 
evidence presented here to answer the question of whether 
orientation toward the common good is being suppressed 
by a stronger commitment to central economic values is 
limited. First of all it should be stated that since our findings 
are based on a non-representative random sample it cannot 
simply be transferred to the German working population 
in general. In view of the size of the survey samples used 
by the study and the fact that the data were collected in the 
context of a cross-sectional study it cannot be ruled out 
that the norm-related orientation patterns of the actors are 
less a consequence than a cause of their market inclusion. It 
would be equally plausible to assume that actors have devel-
oped the orientation pattern of the radical market activist 
independently of their degree of inclusion in the market 
and via these orientation-patterns have later chosen to be 
self-employed. Hence, in themselves the findings do not 
justify the assumption of a pre-forming influence of market 
inclusion on norm-related orientation patterns.23
If one assumes that the empirical findings of the study 
are valid, irrespective of its methodological weaknesses, 
it partially confirms the thesis that as market dominance 
increases an erosion of orientations related to the common 
good takes place in favor of a strengthening of individual 
commitment to economic goals. This seems to apply 
particularly in view of the contrasting presence of norm-
oriented activists on the periphery and radical market activ-
ists at the center of market activity, as reconstructed in the 
present study on the basis of the respondents’ membership 
in particular employment groups. This finding accords with 
the hypothesis formulated at the beginning (on the basis 
of differentiation theory) that the dominance of economic 
institutions in the concert of forces of social order allows 
the guiding principles of the economy as a part of the social 
system to become dominant even at the level of individual 
value orientations or rationality for action and whose logic 
has a subversive effect on attitudes to formal legal and infor-
mal social norms. 
With respect to the “market and morality debate” the find-
ings presented here also allow us to conclude that, contrary 
to the assumptions of liberal social theory, strong inclusion 
in market activity—measured in terms of norm-related 
behavioral intentions and actual behavior of actors—under 
current social conditions is not necessarily accompanied by 
a civilization of behavior. Rather the results of the analyses 
suggest that the increasing inclusion of actors in the insti-
tutional structures of the market encourages norm-related 
orientation patterns that tend to ignore the legitimacy 
of both formal legal and—in the case of radical market 
activists—informal social norms. 
22 Interestingly, another study on the ethical at-
titudes of entrepreneurs produced carried out by 
Ulrich and Thielemann (1992) produced similar 
findings. The authors were able to identify explicit 
or implicit economic orientations in 75 percent of 
the respondents (Ulrich and Thielemann 1992, 93f.).
23 It should be noted in this context, however, that 
the present study clearly distances itself from the 
principle of inductive-empirical proof. Insofar 
as the empirical findings are based on consider-
ations of theories of cause and effect, this is done 
expressly in the context of a theory-led investi-
gation strategy. This means that on the basis of 
assumptions about the link between inclusion in 
market structures and actors’ particular norm-
related orientations we investigated to what extent 
these contradicted the findings of the empirical 
analyses. Exactly in this way the cross-sectional 
analyses used in this study were used to find out 
whether the theoretical assumptions were compat-
ible with the content of the empirical findings.
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Epilogue: Violence and behavioral imperatives of the market
Finally, it would be appropriate to discuss whether the 
findings presented allow conclusions to be drawn about 
market-driven origins of violent behavior. This topic has 
been addressed theoretically by Elliott Currie (1997, 1998), 
Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld (1997), and others. 
Currie (1997) stated that there is a causal nexus between 
an increased occurrence of violent crime and homicide on 
the one hand and the erosion of communitarian networks 
caused by market-driven demands of increased mobility and 
individual flexibility on the other. Regrettably, the present 
study is unable to go into to these theoretical considerations 
in depth. Nevertheless, our empirical findings do allow 
hypothetical statements concerning the origins of a type of 
violent behavior that is labeled in the corporate and white-
collar crime literature as corporate violence (for example 
Punch 2000, 243ff.; Tombs 2007, 531ff.; Friedrichs 2007, 59ff.).
One example of corporate violence would be the acceptance 
of unsafe working conditions, for instance when employ-
ees in the chemical industry are routinely exposed to toxic 
and dangerous chemicals without being equipped with 
protective clothing (Mokhiber 1988). Other examples can 
be found where unsafe products are knowingly delivered 
to consumer markets. One widely described example is the 
Ford Pinto case of the 1970s. Pre-production crash tests had 
established that the fuel system of the Pinto ruptured easily 
in rear-end collisions, causing an explosion. However, Ford 
had already begun tooling assembly line machinery for the 
Pinto, so management chose to manufacture the car as it 
was (see Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2002, 98). Unofficially 
the corporation’s management adopted the position that it 
would be cheaper to finance legal action and compensation 
payments for accidents involving fires and fatal injuries 
than to change the production line (ibid.). Another contem-
poray example of corporate violence against consumers is 
China’s toxic milk scandal, where current estimates show 
that more than 53,000 children have fallen ill and about 
four have died (Economic Times 2008). Chinese dairy 
corporations, especially suppliers of Sanlu Group, used a 
chemical named melamine to make protein levels in milk 
appear higher than they actually were, thus allowing pro-
ducers to cut production costs by watering down milk. In 
this case, too, the industries knew about the toxic properties 
of melamine long before the scandal itself arose. Use of the 
chemical continued for financial reasons. 
This type of corporate violent behavior—exhibited especial-
ly by managers and entrepreneurs—differs from conven-
tional violence in several ways. First, corporate violence is 
committed in an indirect manner in the sense that people 
are not directly assaulted by another individual. Instead 
of they are negligently exposed to harmful conditions, 
products, or substances, for which corporate policies and 
actions are responsible (Friedrichs 2007). Second, the effects 
of managerial or corporate violence are temporally removed 
from the implementation of corporate policies or actions 
that caused the harm (60). Consequently it is often difficult 
to establish a clear causal relationship between corporate 
action and the injury to health or death of people affected. 
Third—and this is the main point of reference for the pres-
ent study—corporate violence is by definition motivated by 
the ambition to maximize corporate earnings (or chances of 
survival) and to minimize corporate expenses (ibid.). There-
fore it is to be understood as a consequence rather than a 
specifically intended outcome of such motivations. Nev-
ertheless in the worldwide perspective corporate violence 
causes more harm to people than indiviudal violence can 
ever do (Tombs 2007, 531f.).
With reference to the subject of the present study—the 
erosion of nomocentric and communitarian orienta-
tions occurring under circumstances of increased market 
dominance—the reported findings supply a plausible expla-
nation for the appearance of corporate violence. Normative 
orientation patterns similar to those of radical market activ-
ism seem to be one central cause of all kinds of corporate 
violence. Common to both is a strong commitment to goals 
of economic success and a comparatively low attachment to 
values of common wealth and legal integrity. Consequently 
it can be hypothesized that the more strongly radical mar-
ket activism is present the market process—other things 
being equal—the more often deeds of corporate violence 
will be committed. Future research in this area should focus 
on empirical tests of this hypothesis—which will be quite 
difficult to examine on a microanalytic level.
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